The State of Utah v. Richard T. White : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
The State of Utah v. Richard T. White : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Amy F. Hugie; Brad C. Smith; Benjamin C. Rasmussen; Bow Elder County Public Defenders;
attorneys for appellee.
Dee W. Smith; Randall W. Richards; Box Elder Attorneys Office; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. White, No. 20040439 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5009
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD T. WHITE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040S394G3OURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
SO 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. gkW(yfe^-oy 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
On Appeal from Defendant's Conviction 
In the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder County 
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield Presiding 
DeeW. Smith, No. 8688 
Randall W. Richards, No. 4503 
Box Elder County Public Defenders 
2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Tel: (801) 399-4191 
Fax:(801)399-4194 
Amy F. Hugie, No. 8207 
Box Elder County Attorney 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
Deputy County Attorneys 
01 South Main 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Tel: (435) 734-3329 
Fax: (435) 734-3374 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Attorneys for Appellant 
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD T. WHITE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Dee W. Smith, No. 8688 
Randall W. Richards, No. 4503 
Box Elder County Public Defenders 
2550 Washington Blvd., Suite 300 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Tel: (801) 399-4191 
Fax:(801)399-4194 
Case No. 20040439-CA 
Amy F. Hugie, No. 8207 
Box Elder County Attorney 
Brad C. Smith, No. 6656 
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462 
Deputy County Attorneys 
01 South Main 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Tel: (435) 734-3329 
Fax: (435) 734-3374 
Attorneys for Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
On Appeal from Defendant's Conviction 
In the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder County 
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield Presiding 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ii 
Table of Authorities iii 
Cases iii 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions iv 
Jurisdiction 1 
Controlling Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 1 
Summary of Argument 1 
I. Defendant Has Not Fulfilled His Obligation to Marshal the Evidence 2 
II. Defendant Was Not Denied His Constitutional Rights By Virtue of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 4 
A. Defendant Has the Burden of Establishing Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 4 
B. The State Produced Sufficient Evidence for a Prima Facie Case, 
Which Precluded a Directed Verdict in Defendant's Favor 6 
III. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error in Not Dismissing the Charges 
Against Defendant Sua Sponte 9 
Conclusion 12 
Certificate of Mailing 14 
Addendum 
Exhibit A: Text of Controlling Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
Exhibit B: Unpublished Decisions 
Exhibit C: Statements of Ronna White and Ronald Webster 
ii 
Table of Authorities 
Cases 
Glauser Storage, L.L.C. v. Smedley, 2001 UT App 141, 27 P.3d 565 11 
State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 11 
State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, 55 P.3d 1131 4 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (1993) 10 
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546 6 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, 84 P.3d 1183 7, 8, 11 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 2 
State v. Munford, 2003 UT App 279, 2003 WL 21805346 5 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 94 P.3d 186 4 
State v. O'Brien, 2003 UT App 419, 2003 WL 22862190 5 
State v. Pirela, 2002 UT App 39, 65 P.3d 307 5 
State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994) 10 
State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310, 2000 WL 33249925 5 
State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App 155, 3 P.3d 192 3 
State v. Shephard, 2004 UT App 448, 2004 WL 2697462 5 
State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, 65 P.3d 648 5 
State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 366, 2004 WL 2361822 5 
State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 989 P.2d 52 6 
State v. Zampedri, 2004 UT App 348, 2004 WL 2251146 5 
iii 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984) 
4,5 
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah 1993) 6 
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 1,6 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 1,7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 1,9 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) 1 
Utah Const., art. I, §12 1 
Utah R. App. P. 30(f) 6 
iv 
Jurisdiction 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict of guilty on two misdemeanor counts, 
Assault against a Peace Officer and Interference with an Arresting Officer. This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(e). 
Controlling Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
The following provisions, copies of which are attached as Exhibit A, are 
controlling: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305. 
4. U.S. Const, amend. VI. 
5. Utah Const., art. I, §12. 
Summary of Argument 
At the trial of this matter, Defendant's counsel argued to the jury that the 
Defendant's physical aggression against police officers was self-defense. The 
jury heard the facts and the judge's instructions regarding self-defense, and in 
turn found the Defendant guilty of two counts. Unsatisfied with the jury's 
interpretation of the facts presented, Defendant, without properly marshaling the 
evidence, now presents his self-defense arguments to this Court in the guise of 
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an ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error argument. Nevertheless, 
Defendant's assertion that he was denied his constitutional rights as a result of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as his assertion that the district court 
committed plain error in not granting a directed verdict sua sponte, is erroneous. 
Under neither argument can Defendant show that he would have been entitled to 
a directed verdict, whether by counsel's motion following the state's case-in-chief, 
or by the court's own initiative prior to submitting the case to the jury. 
Accordingly, the requisite prejudice can not be shown. Defendant's convictions 
for Assault against a Peace Officer and Interference with Arresting Officer should 
be affirmed. 
I. Defendant Has Not Fulfilled His Obligation to Marshal the Evidence. 
This Court has adopted the "marshal the evidence" standard in criminal 
appeals from jury verdicts where the sufficiency of the evidence is in issue. State 
v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In Moore, this Court noted, 
"The process of marshaling the evidence serves the important function of 
reminding litigants and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact 
finder at trial. Such deference is especially appropriate where the fact finder is a 
jury, whose common sense is a valued buffer between the parties." jd. 
(Emphasis added.) This Court has further explained, "It is well established that a 
defendant's burden on appeal when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
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after a jury trial is to '"marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict."'" State v. Rudolph. 2000 UT App 155,1J18, 3 P.3d 192. 
(Citations omitted.)(Emphasis added.) 
In his memorandum, Defendant acknowledges his obligation to marshal the 
evidence in support of the jury verdict. (Br. of Appellant at 21.) However, he 
proceeds to recite the interpretation of the facts that Defendant advocated all 
along through the trial - that Officer Carr attacked the Defendant and was solely 
responsible for the ensuing altercation. For example, in his recitation of the 
evidence, Defendant ignored or brushed aside the significance of the officer's 
testimony regarding his training in dealing with domestic violence situations, as 
well as how to reach under the circumstances he faced. (R. at 109/67, 71.) 
Defendant also ignores Officer Panter's testimony as to the Defendant's profane 
verbal threats after being taken into custody. (R. at 109/106-07.) Further, 
Defendant only mentions the profane threats made to Officer Carr subsequent to 
his recitation of the sequence of events, so as to construe the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the defense. 
Throughout the brief, Defendant repeats his argument that he "was simply 
trying to get away from two very aggressive police officers." (Br. of Appellant at 
18.) Defendant made this same argument at trial, that Officer Carr stepped over 
the line. (R. at 109/171-72.) However, Defendant makes no attempt to marshal 
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the evidence in the proper light. No effort has been made to show anything other 
than the defendant's interpretation of the facts, which was already rejected by the 
jury. The Defendant having failed to marshal the evidence with regards to his 
ineffective assistance and plain error claims, his assertions of error should be 
disregarded. 
II. Defendant Was Not Denied His Constitutional Rights By Virtue of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
A. Defendant Has the Burden of Establishing Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel. 
Defendant's assertion that his constitutional right to counsel has been 
impaired must be evaluated in light of the two part test established by the United 
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under this test: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. This test has also been adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court with reference to determinations of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See, ag,, State v. Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, fl27, 94 P.3d 186; 
Accord, State v. Diaz. 2002 UT App 288, P 8 , 55 P.3d 1131. Reviewing courts 
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employ a presumption that assistance has been adequate. Strickland. 466 U.S. 
at 689. Moreover, the Defendant must establish a reasonable probability that but 
for counsel's professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different. ]d. at 694. Absent a showing of prejudice, an ineffective assistance 
claim necessarily fails. See, e.g., State v. Pirela. 2002 UT App 39,1J25, 65 P.3d 
307 (holding, based on Strickland, that where it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffective assistance claim based on lack of prejudice, that course should be 
followed.) 
Defendant appears to suggest in his brief, given the "general practice" 
amongst defense counsel in criminal trials, that his counsel's performance was 
deficient per se solely for his failure to move for a directed verdict following the 
state's case in chief. (Br. of Appellant at 14.) However, while Defendant correctly 
points the Court to one occasion where a conviction was overturned for failure to 
seek a directed verdict,1 this Court has frequently rejected out of hand ineffective 
assistance claims predicated upon failure to seek a directed verdict. See, e.g.. 
State v. Shephard. 2004 UT App 448, 2004 WL 2697462; State v. Valdez. 2004 
UT App 366, 2004 WL 2361822; State v. Zampedri. 2004 UT App 348, 2004 WL 
2251146; State v. O'Brien. 2003 UT App 419, 2003 WL 22862190; State v. 
Munford. 2003 UT App 279, 2003 WL 21805346; State v. Reves. 2000 UT App 
1See. State v. Smith. 2003 UT App 52, 65 P.3d 648. In Smith, unlike this 
case, the state failed to present evidence as to a key element such that a motion 
for a directed verdict was warranted, id. at 1(31-32. 
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310, 2000 WL 33249925;2 Tillman v. Cook. 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 
1993)(holding failure to raise motion to dismiss not ineffective where there was 
sufficient evidence to support the charges). 
B. The State Produced Sufficient Evidence for a Prima Facie Case, 
Which Precluded a Directed Verdict in Defendant's Favor. 
A defense counsel's failure to raise a futile motion does not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel. See, State v. Kellev. 2000 UT 41, fl26, 1 P.3d 
546; State v. Whittle. 1999 UT 96,1J34, 989 P.2d 52. In this case, had 
Defendant's counsel moved for a directed verdict, it would have been futile 
because the state produced sufficient evidence of the elements of the crimes 
charged. As a result, counsel's performance was not deficient, and in turn, 
Defendant suffered no prejudice by his counsel's failure to move for a directed 
verdict. 
To support its charges the state was required to show, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-102: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to 
another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
2Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 30(f), copies of the foregoing unpublished 
decisions of this Court are attached as Exhibit B for reference of the Court and 
counsel. 
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In addition, the state was required to show that Officer Carr was a peace officer 
acting within the scope of his authority, and that Defendant knew he was a peace 
officer. See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4. If the state has produced "believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged," a motion for directed verdict 
should be denied. State v. Montova. 2004 UT 5, fl29, 84 P.3d 1183. 
In his testimony, Officer Carr testified that the Defendant stated he had a 
knife and went to reach for it. Officer Carr grabbed his wrist when he proceeded 
to reach for it and advised him to keep his hands out. (R. at 109/71.)3 The 
Defendant then pulled his hand out aggressively with the knife in his hand. 
Notwithstanding Defendant's resistance, Officer Carr secured the knife. (R. at 
109/71.) Defendant had his fist clenched and was looking back at Officer Carr. 
Officer Carr inquired as to what was in the hand - and eventually told the 
Defendant to drop whatever it was. The Defendant did not comply. (R. at 
109/72.) 
Officer Carr tried to secure Defendant because of his clenched right fist 
and the Defendant progressed towards Officer Carr forcing him to spin around 
backwards. At that point, according to Officer Carr, "he immediately began to 
fight me." He testified that it happened quickly but that he was in a physically 
demanding position. Officer Carr was trying to gain control over the Defendant, 
3Officer Carr further indicated that his actions were justified by the volatile 
nature of the domestic violence call and his training in how to react to similar 
situations. (R. at 109/67, 71.) 
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but the fight continued. (R. at 109/73.) Meanwhile, the Defendant was shouting 
profanities at Officer Carr, including the paraphrased threat, "I'm going to F-ing 
kick your F-ing A if you don't let me go." The Defendant was also pushing away 
from the wall to gain mobility against Officer Carr, and the altercation continued. 
(R. at 109/74.) Throughout this, the family was interfering in Officer Carr's efforts 
to restrain the Defendant. (R. at 109/75.) Eventually, Officer Mackley came in to 
assist. (R. at 109/76.) In his efforts, Officer Carr offered Defendant to pull his 
arm down if he would stop resisting and put it behind his back. Instead, the 
Defendant sucked this arm underneath his chest making the officer's attempts to 
secure him more difficult. (R. at 109/76.) Shortly thereafter, the Defendant 
looked over his shoulder and elbowed Officer Mackley in the chin and face. (R. 
at 109/77; 100.) Following the fight, Officer Carr had an abrasion on his elbow 
and pain in his right shoulder. (R. at 109/78.) 
Even after the Defendant was put under control and taken to the hospital to 
be attended to, Defendant was threatening the transporting officers that he would 
"kick [their] fucking asses" and that "he could take on any pig out there." He 
indicated his hope to meet the officers on the street. (R. at 109/106.) 
In this case, with the reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the state,4 
Officer Carr was at Defendant's home to investigate a report of a family fight. 
Defendant instigated a fight upon Officer Carr's attempts to restrain him in the 
4See, Montova. at 1J29. 
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course of the investigation. He used unlawful force leaving Officer Carr in "a 
physically demanding position." He drew out the confrontation with Officer Carr 
leaving him with abrasions and pain in the shoulder, all the while shouting out 
threats with profanity. Furthermore, the Defendant elbowed Officer Mackley in 
the face, and continued with his treats after being taken for treatment when the 
fight was controlled by officers. These facts are sufficient to create believable 
evidence supporting any of the three definitions of assault under the statute. The 
jury further heard testimony that Officer Carr was on duty, and called to 
investigate the circumstances at Defendant's home. (R. at 109/66.) 
Given that there was believable evidence as to all of the elements of 
Assault on a Police Officer,5 defense counsel had no obligation to move for a 
directed verdict. Any such motion would have lacked merit, and would have 
accordingly been futile. As such, Defendant has not been denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
III. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error in Not Dismissing the 
Charges Against Defendant Sua Sponte. 
Just as in his ineffective assistance claim, Defendant repeats that the trial 
defendant raises no argument as to the lack of believable evidence 
regarding Count II, for which he was also convicted. Moreover, the testimony of 
the officers also was sufficiently believable evidence that the Defendant 
committed the crime of Interference With Arresting Officer under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-305. 
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court's failure to sua sponte dismiss the state's charges based on his self defense 
arguments was plain error. A defendant seeking to establish plain error must 
show (1) an error exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, 
and (3) the error is harmful, or undermines confidence in the court's verdict. See, 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208 (1993). Defendant has not established plain 
error under this test. 
Indeed, if any element of the plain error test is not established, there has 
been no plain error. See, State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994), 
citing. Dunn, at 1209. In this case, there was no error in the first place under the 
first prong of the test. As set forth above, in its case, the state produced 
believable evidence to support a conviction for Assault on a Peace Officer. 
Afterwards, Defendant principally called two witnesses, Ronald Webster 
and Ronna White, the Defendant's father-in-law and wife respectively. Ronald 
Webster opined that an officer had thrown his son against the wall and 
purposefully damaged family pictures. (R. at 109/127.) Ronna White also was 
called to testify that Officer Carr had slammed Defendant into a wall. (R. at 
109/143.)6 
6The credibility of both of Defendants' witnesses were undermined on cross 
examination. Ronald Webster testified that the officer present in court, Officer 
Carr, had not been the one to allegedly come after the Defendant. (R. at 
109/135). Nor did he mention his claims of police violence in his written 
statement to police. (R. at 109/132-36). Likewise, Ronna White's testimony was 
in direct conflict with her initial written statement to the police regarding the 
episode. (R. at 109/147-51). These statements are attached as Exhibit C. 
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Notwithstanding this testimony, whether Defendant was entitled to a 
directed verdict at the close of testimony depends on whether, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the state, a prima facie case had been established of the 
elements of the crime charged. Montova. at fl29. Through the testimony 
highlighted in the previous section, the state produced believable testimony from 
Officers Carr, Mackley, and Panter that Defendant had committed Assault on a 
Peace Officer. The jury, as finder of fact, was free to weight the testimony and 
make its own determination as to what testimony to believe or disbelieve. See. 
State v. Caver. 814 P.2d 604, 612 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Glauser Storage. LLC, 
v. Smedlev. 2001 UT App 141,1J24, 27 P.3d 565. The district court properly 
submitted the question of Defendant's guilt to their consideration. There was no 
error by the district court in not directing a verdict from the jury. 
As set forth previously, Defendant's failure to establish the first prong is 
sufficient basis alone to reject his claim of plain error. However, the other two 
prongs likewise have not been established. Under the second prong, because 
there was no error, failure to recognize the error could not have been obvious to 
the trial court. Likewise, under the third prong, the absence of a directed verdict 
from the trial court does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the 
proceeding. A jury of the Defendant's peers heard all of the evidence and was 
properly instructed regarding the elements of the crimes charged.7 The jury 
defendant raises no challenge to the sufficiency of the instructions given. 
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acquitted the Defendant of Counts Three and Five, regarding simple assault and 
intoxication. However, the strength and adequacy of the state's evidence is 
manifest by the jury's guilty verdict with regards to Count One and Two. (R. at 
80.) The jury clearly scrutinized the facts, acquitting Defendant where they 
deemed appropriate, and convicting where they found sufficient evidence. 
Accordingly, there was no harm to Defendant under the plain error test. 
Conclusion 
Defendant has not fulfilled his obligation to marshal the evidence in support 
of the jury's verdict, and even had he done so, Defendant was not deprived of his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Defendant's counsel would 
have been pursuing a futile motion in seeking a directed verdict at the close of the 
state's case, and as such, his failure to so move was not ineffective. The state 
produced believable evidence to establish its prima facie case of Assault on a 
Peace Officer. For the same reason, there was no plain error in the judge's 
failure to direct a verdict for Defendant sua sponte. The question of Defendant's 
guilt was properly submitted to the jury on the evidence presented, and 
Defendant was justly convicted. 
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DATED this 2U day of May, 2005. 
•> 
Amy F. Hugie 
Box Elder County Attorney 
Brad C. Smith 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
Deputy County Attorneys 
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following individuals: 
Dee W. Smith 
Randall W. Richards 
Box Elder Public Defenders 
2568 Washington Blvd., Suite 200 
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Exhibit A 
Controlling Statutes and Constitutional Provisions 
Controlling Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102: 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4: 
(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a 
peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or another correctional 
facility, a minimum of: 
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and 
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense. 
(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required 
under Subsection (2) if the court finds that the interests of justice would be best 
served and makes specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the 
record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing 
any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
U.S. Const, amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Utah Const, art. I, §12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused 
person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at 
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
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Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
THORNE, Judge: 
*1 Defendant Dean Alan Shephard appeals his 
conviction for possession or operation of a 
clandestine laboratory in violation of Utah's 
Clandestine Drug Lab Act (the Act). See Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37d-4 (2002). We affirm. 
Shephard first argues that his conviction should be 
reversed because the evidence of his connection to 
the lab equipment was insufficient to prove a nexus. 
Shephard presents an independent sufficiency of 
the evidence argument and an argument that the 
trial court committed plain error by failing to 
dismiss the case sua sponte. However, Shephard's 
failure to preserve his sufficiency of the evidence 
argument eliminates his opportunity to argue 
sufficiency on traditional grounds and limits his 
available argument to challenging the trial court's 
inaction. See generally State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74,fl 11-14, 10P.3d346. 
"As a general rule, to ensure that the trial court 
addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, a 
defendant must request that the court do so.... 
[W]hen a defendant fails to make such a motion" 
the trial court is under no duty to examine the 
evidence. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,ffl[ 14-16, 
10 P.3d 346. However, "there is a certain point at 
which an evidentiary insufficiency is so obvious and 
fundamental that it would be plain error for the trial 
court not to discharge the defendant." Id. at f 17. 
On appeal, we will conclude that such a point was 
reached if, "after viewing the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence 'is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable 
such that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he or she was convicted.' " Id at 1f 
18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 
(Utah 1993)). But even if we find that this condition 
has been met, we will not reverse unless we then 
determine that "the evidentiary defect was so 
obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to 
submit the case to the jury." Id. 
Shephard argues that the State's evidence failed to 
establish any nexus or connection between 
Shephard and the lab equipment. The Act prohibits 
the actual or constructive possession of a controlled 
substance precursor or laboratory equipment with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4; State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987). To 
prove constructive possession, there must be a 
"sufficient nexus" between the accused and the 
clandestine laboratory to permit an inference that 
the accused had "both the power and the intent to 
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exercise dominion and control over" the laboratory 
materials. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,K 13, 985 
P.2d 911 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Here, the State presented ample evidence 
connecting Shephard to the illegal laboratory. 
Police discovered a clandestine laboratory in the 
garage of a house. Although he did not reside there, 
Shephard was alone in the house when the police 
arrived. The homeowner testified that a bicycle 
found outside the garage containing the lab, a 
backpack containing glassware and 
methamphetamine precursors, and a jacket found 
near the lab all belonged to Shephard. Additionally, 
the police found Shephard's fingerprint on both lab 
glassware and a digital scale found in the home. 
Police officers also discovered both 
methamphetamine and a recipe for cooking 
methamphetamine in the house. Finally, a witness 
testified that he had visited the house to use 
methamphetamine with Shephard and, if product 
was available, to purchase methamphetamine from 
him. 
*2 After examining the evidence that was before 
the trial court, we have no difficulty in concluding 
that a reasonable jury could have determined that 
Shephard was connected to the lab and responsible 
for its operation. Consequently, Shephard's first 
claim is without merit. 
Shephard also argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective by failing to move for a directed verdict 
based on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. 
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Shephard must show that his counsel's performance 
was objectively deficient and that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant. See State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41,J 25, 1 P.3d 546 (quotations 
and citations omitted). However "[fjailure to raise 
futile objections does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel." Id. at If 26. We have 
examined the State's evidence and can see no 
possibility that a motion for a directed verdict 
would have succeeded. See State v. Montoya, 2004 
UT 5,f[ 28-29, 84 P.3d 1183 (reciting the 
standard of review for the denial of a motion for a 
directed verdict). Consequently, a motion for a 
directed verdict would have been futile and 
counsel's failure to make the motion does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Presiding 
Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
2004 WL 2697462 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 448 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
*1 Defendant Tracy Valdez appeals the drug-free 
zone enhancement of his conviction for possession 
of methamphetamine, a second degree felony. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), 
(4)(a)(vi)-(vii), (4)(a)(ix) (Supp.2004). [FN1] We 
affirm. 
FN1. Although the legislature has amended 
Utah Code section 58-37- 8 since 
Defendant was charged, the amendment 
does not affect the outcome of this case. 
Therefore, for ease of reference, we cite to 
the most recent version of the statute. 
In support of his appeal Defendant presents two 
Page 1 
arguments. First, Defendant asserts that the State's 
evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to 
convict him of the drug-free zone enhancement 
based on proximity to a church. Second, he argues 
that his counsel's failure to move for a directed 
verdict constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel. [FN2] 
FN2. Defendant also challenges his 
conviction on the grounds that the 
shopping area near his arrest was not a 
"shopping mall" under the terms of the 
drug-free zone enhancement penalty 
statute. We decline to address this issue, as 
a reasonable jury could have convicted the 
defendant based on his proximity to the 
two church properties while he was at the 
apartment. 
As to Defendant's first claim, because he did not 
preserve an objection at trial to the trial court's 
submission of the enhancement to the jury, and 
because he did not allege any "procedural 
anomalies or other exceptional circumstances," 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,t 12, 10 P.3d 346, 
that impeded such a preservation, we review his 
claim under a plain error standard, with all 
inferences viewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See id at % 18. 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred because the 
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
establish that he was in possession of a controlled 
substance at the apartment where he was staying. 
While Utah Code section 58- 37-8(2)(a)(i) makes 
the possession of a controlled substance a second 
degree felony, if the possession occurs within 1000 
feet of a church, the penalty is enhanced to a first 
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
58-37-8(4)(a)(ix), (4)(b). Defendant concedes that 
the apartment building was located less than 1000 
feet from two church parking lots, but nevertheless 
argues that the jury lacked sufficient evidence that 
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he possessed any controlled substances while at or 
leaving the apartment. Essentially, Defendant 
asserts that he could have acquired the 
methamphetamine during the thirty to forty-five 
seconds that Officer Giles could not see him. 
However, the jury could have reasonably based its 
determination on the testimony of Officer Giles, 
that Defendant could not have obtained the drugs in 
the brief time he could not see Defendant. Hence, 
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's 
conclusion. Accordingly, there was no error by the 
trial court. Because the trial court did not err, the 
defendant necessarily fails to establish plain error. 
Second, Defendant asserts that his counsel's failure 
to move for a directed verdict regarding the 
drug-free zone enhancement penalty at the end of 
the State's case in chief constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel we have consistently followed the United 
States Supreme Court standard in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Thus, the 
defendant has the burden to "show 'first, that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant.' " State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41,K 25, 1 P.3d 546 (quoting 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994)) 
(other quotation and citation omitted). 
*2 Defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails 
because he cannot show that he was prejudiced by 
his attorney's failure to move for a directed verdict. 
We have determined that the evidence presented at 
trial was sufficient to convict Defendant. Thus, 
counsel's objection to the sufficiency of the 
evidence would have properly been overruled by 
the trial court. Defense counsel's failure to raise a 
futile objection cannot be grounds for ineffective 
assistance of counsel. See id. at f 26. 
Accordingly, we affirm the jury's verdict and 
Defendant's sentence. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges. 
2004 WL 2361822 (Utah App.), 2004 UT App 366 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
DAVIS, Judge: 
*1 Albert Dennis Zampedri (Defendant) appeals 
his convictions of attempted aggravated murder and 
attempted murder. We affirm. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by 
instructing the jury that it could convict Defendant 
of attempted aggravated murder and attempted 
murder if it found that he committed either crime 
"knowingly." Because Defendant's trial counsel did 
not object to the instructions at issue, we will 
review those instructions for error "only 'to avoid a 
manifest injustice.' " State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 
1027, 1029 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted); see Utah 
R.Crim. P. 19(e) ("Unless a party objects to an 
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the 
instruction may not be assigned as error except to 
avoid a manifest injustice."). " '[I]n most 
circumstances, the term "manifest injustice" is 
synonymous with the "plain error" standard....' " 
Powell, 872 P.2d at 1029 (citation omitted). 
"[T]o establish the existence of plain error and to 
obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that 
was not properly objected to, the appellant must 
show the following: (i)[a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." ... [I]f any 
one of those requirements is not met, plain error is 
not established. 
Id. at 1031 (first alteration in original) (citation 
omitted). In Defendant's case, the challenged 
instructions comported with the mens rea 
requirements for both attempted aggravated murder 
and attempted murder in effect at the time of the 
incident and at the time he was charged, tried, and 
convicted. As such, the alleged error could not " 
'have been obvious to the trial court.' " Id (citation 
omitted). Therefore, Defendant has not established 
the existence of plain error. See id. 
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel 
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request 
that the trial court strike the term "knowingly" from 
its instructions to the jury on attempted aggravated 
murder and attempted murder. Because the 
challenged instructions comported with the mens 
rea requirements for both attempted aggravated 
murder and attempted murder in effect at the time 
of the incident and at the time Defendant was 
charged, tried, and convicted, it would have been 
futile for Defendant's trial counsel to request that 
the trial court strike the term "knowingly" from 
those instructions. Therefore, Defendant's trial 
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counsel did not render ineffective assistance by 
failing to make such a request. See State v. Wallace, 
2002 UT App 295,H 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (stating that 
" 'failure of counsel to make motions or objections 
which would be futile if raised does not constitute 
ineffective assistance'" (citation omitted)). [FN1] 
FN1. In support of his first two arguments, 
Defendant relies exclusively upon State v. 
Casey, 2003 UT 55, 82 P.3d 1106. 
However, Defendant makes no attempt to 
explain why Casey is retroactively 
applicable to his case. In addition, 
Defendant fails to address whether the 
legislature's recent amendment to the 
attempt statute is retroactively applicable 
to his case. Although the State addresses 
the latter issue, we do not address either 
issue because of Defendant's failure to 
analyze them in his brief. See State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304-05 (Utah 1998) 
Finally, Defendant argues that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support a 
determination that he possessed the requisite mens 
rea for either attempted aggravated murder or 
attempted murder. Based upon this argument, 
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by failing to move for a 
directed verdict, and that the trial court committed 
plain error by failing to enter a directed verdict on 
its own motion. After reviewing the record, we 
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to 
support a determination that Defendant possessed 
the requisite mens rea, under the then-correct 
instructions given to the jury, for both attempted 
aggravated murder and attempted murder. Because 
a motion for directed verdict would have been 
futile, Defendant's counsel did not render 
ineffective assistance by failing to make such a 
motion. See id. Further, because the trial court did 
not err by failing to enter a directed verdict on its 
own motion, Defendant cannot, by definition, 
establish the existence of plain error. See Powell, 
872P.2datl031. 
*2 Affirmed. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Judge and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
*1 William King O'Brien appeals from a 
conviction for attempted aggravated murder, a 
first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated section 76-5-202 (Supp.2003). We 
affirm. 
O'Brien's conviction resulted from a high-speed 
chase during which O'Brien, driving a vehicle 
reported stolen and armed with a handgun, 
attempted to escape police capture. O'Brien 
contends that (1) the district court lacked sufficient 
evidence to send the attempted aggravated murder 
charge to the jury; and (2) the trial evidence was 
insufficient to support O'Brien's conviction for 
attempted aggravated murder of a police officer. 
However, O'Brien's defense counsel failed to make 
a motion for a directed verdict at trial to preserve 
these sufficiency of the evidence claims for appeal. 
See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,J 11, 10 P.3d 
346; State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,f 18, 42 
P.3d 1248. Thus, O'Brien challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence at trial by claiming ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel in failing to move for a 
directed verdict. See State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
114,T[ 21 n. 2, 61 P.3d 1062 ("When a party fails 
to preserve an issue for appeal, we will nevertheless 
review the issue if the appealing party ... assert[s] 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to 
preserve the issue."). Therefore, to dispose of 
O'Brien's claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, we must first examine O'Brien's claims of 
insufficiency of evidence. 
"When evaluating whether the State produced 
sufficient 'believable evidence' to withstand a 
challenge at the close of the State's case in chief[ 
i.e., a motion for a directed verdict], we apply the 
same standard used when reviewing a jury verdict." 
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,1 41, 70 P.3d 111. 
"Hence, [sufficient] evidence in this context means 
the evidence must be 'capable of supporting a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Id 
(quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9,1 15, 20 P.3d 
300). 
O'Brien argues that "[w]here the only evidence 
presented against [him] is circumstantial, the 
evidence supporting a conviction must preclude 
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." State v. 
Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986). "This is 
because the existence of a reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt." Id However, our supreme 
court has held that this rule "is not controlling when 
only part of the evidence is circumstantial." State v. 
Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976) (emphasis 
added). 
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Despite O'Brien's arguments to the contrary, the 
record reflects that the State's case was not based on 
circumstantial evidence alone. The State put on the 
following direct and circumstantial evidence with 
regard to the intent and substantial step elements of 
the attempted aggravated murder charge: (1) 
O'Brien was illegally armed with a handgun; (2) 
police attempted to stop O'Brien while he was in 
possession of a stolen vehicle; (3) O'Brien tried to 
avoid capture by leading police on a high-speed 
automobile chase; (4) O'Brien only stopped because 
he lost control of his vehicle; (5) when O'Brien did 
stop, a shot was fired from inside his vehicle; (6) 
moments later O'Brien emerged from the wrecked 
vehicle holding the handgun; (7) O'Brien again ran 
from police, this time on foot; (8) once 
apprehended, O'Brien sang a rap song about killing 
"cops" with handguns; and (9) crime scene 
investigators later found that a bullet apparently hit 
the pursuing officer's windshield at approximately 
throat level. 
*2 Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that " 
'the evidence to support the verdict was completely 
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to 
make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.' " 
State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,1 10, 42 P.3d 
1248 (quoting State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292,f 
13, 13 P.3d 604). Therefore, we hold that 
theevidence in this case was sufficient to survive a 
motion for a directed verdict. 
"The failure of counsel to make motions ... which 
would be futile if raised does not constitute 
ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 
1 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citation 
omitted). Thus, we hold that O'Brien was not 
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH and 
WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Judges. 
2003 WL 22862190 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App 
419 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 "In reviewing a jury verdict, we view the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1993). 
"Appellant bears a heavy burden of establishing 
'that the evidence is so inconclusive or insubstantial 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime.' " 
Julian v. State, 2002 UT 61,1 16, 52 P.3d 1169 
(quoting State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 
(Utah 1980)). This court "will not 'substitute its 
judgment for that of the fact finder.' " Id. (quoting 
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980)). 
Further, this court "will not 'weigh conflicting 
evidence [or] the credibility of witnesses.' " Id. 
(quoting State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813-14 
(Utah 1977)). Accordingly, we must assume the 
jury believed the testimony of the State's witnesses. 
See Dunn, 850 P.2dat 1213. 
Munford's burden is heightened in this instance 
because he concedes that the issue of the sufficiency 
of the evidence was not preserved in the trial court. 
Therefore, he must demonstrate plain error. See 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,1 13, 10 P.3d 346. 
The requirements for plain error are that (1) error 
exists, (2) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. See id, 
Munford argues on appeal that the State proved 
only his presence at the homicide, not participation. 
We disagree. The evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, demonstrates acts on 
Munford's part that could be construed as 
knowledge and participation, particularly in light of 
Kiriluk's roommate's testimony that Munford was 
present on at least one occasion where Kiriluk 
indicated he was going to kill Brown. The 
cumulative evidence was certainly not so 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained doubt. 
Munford also argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective in failing to move for a directed verdict 
. However, because we determine that the evidence 
was sufficient to support the jury verdict, it stands 
to reason that a motion for a directed verdict 
would have been unsuccessful and futile. "The 
decision to forgo futile acts does not amount to 
ineffective assistance." State v. Wallace, 2002 UT 
App295,f27, 55P.3dll47. 
The conviction is affirmed. 
2003 WL 21805346 (Utah App.), 2003 UT App 
279 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ORME. 
*1 When a claim of ineffective assistance is raised 
for the first time on appeal, we resolve the issue as a 
matter of law. See State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 
1179 (Utah Ct.App.), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1994). "Despite the application of a standard 
normally bereft of deference, appellate review of 
counsel's performance must be highly deferential; 
otherwise, the 'distorting effects of hindsight' would 
produce too great a temptation for courts to 
second-guess trial counsel's performance on the 
basis of an inanimate record." State v. Tennyson, 
850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (citation 
omitted). 
Appellant does not show that there were witnesses 
or counselors whom his attorney could have found 
who would have offered favorable testimony. 
Indeed, appellant admits that "it is ... a matter of 
speculation, which witnesses may or may not have 
assisted [him] in his defense." Appellant also failed 
to make the alleged phone records part of the record 
on appeal. "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of 
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be 
a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 
P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
Appellant does not demonstrate how counsel's 
cross-examination strategy-which was basically to 
have the child victim repeat her testimony, 
including its inconsistencies—was deficient. Counsel 
may well have concluded this low-key approach 
would sit better with the jury than aggressive 
cross-examination of a child. Accordingly, we 
indulge the presumption that this approach was 
sound trial strategy. 
Both the Utah Criminal Code and the Utah Rules 
of Evidence make it clear that a twelve-year-old 
child is competent to be a witness. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-410 (1999); Utah R.Evid. 601. The 
trial court did give a general instruction concerning 
the jury's duty to assess each witness's credibility. 
No specialized cautionary instruction concerning a 
twelve-year-old's testimony is required by Utah law. 
Appellant's counsel was, therefore, not deficient for 
failing to request one. 
None of the statements cited by appellant in his 
brief constitute inadmissable hearsay under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 801. As correctly set out in the 
State's brief, appellant had already "manifested an 
adoption or belief in [the] truth" of two of the 
statements by admitting their substance in a written 
statement to police and on the stand at trial. Utah 
R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). The other statements were 
not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, 
but instead were offered for other purposes. See 
Utah RJEvid. 801(c). [FN1] 
FN1. It could be argued that defense 
counsel should have objected to these 
statements, even if they were not 
technically hearsay, on the chance that the 
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prosecutor might not have resisted or that END OF DOCUMENT 
the trial court might otherwise have 
sustained the objection. However, 
appellant's counsel may well have been 
afraid that by objecting and having her 
objection overruled, she would look 
incompetent in the jury's eyes. Again, 
where we can articulate "a rational basis 
for counsel's performance," we presume 
that counsel's conduct was pursuant to 
sound trial strategy rather than ineptitude. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 468. 
Appellant also claims his counsel was 
ineffective for her failure to object to the 
prosecution's repeated references to the 
victim's age. This claim fails because 
appellant has not shown how the 
references to the victim's age, which was 
never in dispute and was presumably 
obvious to the jury, in any way prejudiced 
his case. 
Appellant's claim that his counsel was ineffective 
for failing to make a motion for directed verdict 
succeeds only if the State's evidence was not 
sufficient to support a conviction. Cf. Tillman v. 
Cook 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993) (rejecting 
ineffective assistance claim based on failure to 
move to dismiss where evidence to convict was 
sufficient), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994). The 
claim fails because the facts viewed in the light 
most favorable to the State show that appellant 
broke into the eleven-year-old victim's room and 
asked her to perform oral sex on him. This evidence 
is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
solicitation to commit sodomy on a child and to 
send the case to the jury. The inconsistencies in the 
victim's uncorroborated testimony were not 
substantial enough to render the evidence 
insufficient as a matter of law. See State v. Marcum, 
750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988). 
*2 Affirmed. 
BENCH and DAVIS, JJ., concur 
2000 WL 33249925 (Utah App.), 2000 UT App 
310 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Exhibit C 
Statements of Ronna White and Ronald Webster 
Brigham City Police Department 
20 N Main St 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Office (435)723-3424, Fax (435)723-5011 
Voluntary Statement 
Time: Case No. Date: '7/Wffh 
I ^ /V/ f l / 1 l ) _ X - / f i , DOB: 1/l'rJ/,l[/J , License * 
S-D
 K j / ) L - (Address) 
i n ^ j f t o U j y J l l . f / j phone: 
  -7 _) ' J^y A 
I ) fOifv and stated ^ ' ' '—" )1 
Do herelfr make the/following s t a i e m e n t l j \ )/)A ffi ,-jfl j) \fllW U $1$ / # i / V / i / ? ^ / J ^ 
M w~ m 
>/i>in-tii*11 -rnoK Mi^  ygn> // <ito/' ? /, /yd/zM /T/II/9 //;l£ 
^Vj'rtflgr-Aig'i^-./liul ii3l/?..)Wnn tiffin Y?u>>~7W . 
sfs 1 iwr ^ftMrtfo'/^iTTVrrkIf {WW bl.p QC 'TlJPid-
4 ^ 7 .^ "r 
mm \J I/./ .UO/it 
.(Arj/i I n ^yf^ '- zvaioi! 
tTTiiTl f'.1/JM T f M ? ^ , .•T/^fMj,"/ • r r^^f i r -^ ' 11/7,-fri 
.^r.^io'rr ,:r 
V4IWWiS[ftilgr^^iiy^rl tof/llw"^ ^ i l i l f tM^ 
r understand that this statement may be us&Lat a oreliminarv hearing, and that any fake 
y> 
^-^stat^ments made hemu are punishable as a criminal offense, 
















m^ wL km>m\ &< J^s7^%7fe 
A 
nWo-Otmr m$ mwimlmin tow 




% pM 0 ^ fydMs fiA-owrmd. n l^tpm 
• » • 
'W' 
flip ojt;C£.r"S /i()][_y ' i„ *.^  o W o 
# 7 M iooiilc) [/#e afm^ m\ rafetoj.iu ,4 4% ^ 
TUO^ over9. 1
 . //! ,f I r-ym 7 / lMC^€i At 
> i i 
/7 
^ / 
- 7 '* ^frit/Hi iMr^Up^ef-
rotfS^® 
?f) NOHTH MATN.ST'PJ?,F:T 
BRIGHAM.-CITY, UTAR 84302 
OFFICE 801-723-3421 FAX 801-723-
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT 
CITy:1^,U^v (Q^^UJ^ PHONE &_42S=LZ23sJ^£ll 







i^d 4 ^ i 2 X t ^ _ . ^ c i i Z k l^Or Si A^sSe e^r 1-
-r Llb_ 
/ W - ^ 
r 
^e^a 




^0 ^ kLjfUxi ^a^^aettf-g' Sjan^. y_i? 'T^^ '^ j^c^A.J^ t l ^^^^JL^ /7 tv-r- ^ k r ^ ^ g 
- -c2^»A/ - - i<&j£^<a^^ 
. ^ o £ • 4 - ^ — «—: T — - f v v • » - — v*' • i i — ; r—•—r—i—~—y cs 1 —f '~*-+%~i—i If*—*"'x " t~* *" '*"™*g—*t~"^—S—t-^--^'' * • ^ y - t x * " 
vr> 
Si rS >. r-r-. T>V . 
